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Overeducation and its effects on wages:  
a closer look at the Spanish regions
Laura Hernández *, Lorenzo Serrano **
ABSTRACT: This paper uses data from the 2004 to 2009 Living Conditions Sur-
vey (LCS) to analyze the wage gap between the adjusted and the overqualified 
employees in the Spanish regions using standard Mincer equations, quantile re-
gression and the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The results indicate that in Spain 
there is a 28% difference between the gross hourly wage between the overqualified 
and well-matched employees, of which 25 percentage points correspond to the 
discrimination effect and only three percentage points correspond to the charac-
teristics of the individuals and the firms they work in. These results show that the 
effects of overeducation on the regional economies are genuine and substantial and 
present a considerable heterogeneity.
JEL Classification: J24, J31, R23.
Keywords: Overeducation, education mismatch, returns to education, quantile re-
gression, regional labour markets.
Sobreeducación y sus efectos sobre los salarios: una mirada  
a las regiones españolas
RESUMEN: Este trabajo utiliza datos de la Encuesta sobre Condiciones de Vida 
(ECV) desde 2004 hasta 2009 para analizar la brecha salarial entre los trabajadores 
ajustados y los sobrecualificados en las regiones españolas utilizando ecuaciones de 
Mincer estándar, regresiones cuantílicas y la descomposición de Oaxaca-Blinder. 
Los resultados indican que en España hay una diferencia del 28% entre el salario 
bruto por hora que reciben los trabajadores sobrecualificados y los adecuadamente 
ajustados, de los cuales 25 puntos porcentuales se deben al efecto discriminación 
y únicamente tres puntos al efecto de las características de los individuos y de las 
empresas donde trabajan. Estos resultados muestran que los efectos de la sobree-
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ducación sobre las economías regionales son genuinos y sustanciales y presentan 
una considerable heterogeneidad.
Clasificación JEL: J24, J31, R23.
Palabras clave: Sobreeducación, desajuste educativo, rendimientos a la educa-
ción, mercados de trabajo regionales.
Introduction
Overeducation is becoming one of the main economic issues in Spain. This is a 
serious problem from an individual point of view but also from an aggregate one as 
it seems that an important part of the working population has acquired more educa-
tion than required in their respective jobs. Overeducation is related to inefficiency 
problems, as individuals may not take advantage of all the knowledge and skills and 
education is costly not only for the individuals but also to the whole society. The 
existence of overeducation in the modern economies shows that it is not enough 
to improve the skills and competences of the labour force, but it is necessary also 
to achieve a better match between education and jobs. This mismatch may reduce 
productivity and competitiveness, both fostering underemployment and unemploy-
ment. Thus, the main consequences of overeducation are personal dissatisfaction and 
lower wages for workers and less productivity for firms. All this may lead to a lower 
volume of production related to the inputs used, so that these differences with respect 
to other economies or firms can cause losses in competitiveness. This is especially 
true at a regional level since regions are fully open economies extremely dependent 
on their competitiveness. Therefore, the way each regional economy deals with this 
problem is a key factor to understand their final economic performance. However, 
the analysis must consider not only the frequency of overeducation but also its spe-
cific effects on productivity looking at the wage differentials across regions and their 
determinants.
In this paper, we use data from the Spanish Living Conditions Survey (LCS) 
for the period 2004-2009 to analyze the wage differentials caused by overeduca-
tion in the Spanish regions. We use a quantile regression approach to account for 
the existence of non-uniform effects of overeducation over the wage distribution. 
Thus, we can measure the changes in salary between the overeducated and the ad-
justed workers at different deciles of the wage distribution and conclude if there is 
a larger dispersion among overeducated workers. There is also a part of the overe-
ducation literature that relates unobservable characteristics of the individuals, like 
innate ability or motivation, to different locations in the wage distribution. In that 
case, more skilled workers would be located at the upper part or the wage distribu-
tion and vice versa. With quantile regression we can estimate the wage differentials 
between low and high ability overeducated workers and see if, related to the believe 
that overeducated individuals are less able and productive, their lower wages are 
a consequence or their lower innate abilities and are not related to the mismatch 
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between education and skills required in their jobs. According to this idea workers 
located in the lower part of the wage distribution and thus less able should show a 
greater wage differential. However, like Budría and Moro-Egido (2007, 2009) for 
the EU countries, we find that overeducated employees in the upper part of the wage 
distribution are more penalized than overeducated workers in the lower part of the 
wage distribution. This in turn, as these authors point out, seems to be the conse-
quence of a lack of efficiency in the allocation of skills to the characteristics of the 
productive sector.
We also investigate whether the wage gap between the overeducated and the ad-
justed workers in the Spanish regions is due to differences in the individuals’ and 
firms’ characteristics or to differences in the way the Spanish regional labour mar-
kets compensate these characteristics. We do it through the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present some overeducation 
approaches and evidences and the approximation followed in this paper to measure 
it. In Section 2 we present the dataset and estimate the average regional effect of 
overeducation on wages. In Section 3 we present the quantile regression model and 
its results. In section 4 we present the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and its results. 
Section 5 concludes.
1.  Overeducation background
Overeducation is related to the possession of an education level higher than the 
one required by the job. Although education can be measured differently, the evi-
dence is that there is an important part of overeducated workers. The existence of 
overeducation contradicts the Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1964), as this theory 
predicts that workers with higher education levels will be paid higher wages and we 
find workers with the same level of education and significant wage differentials. This 
evidence could be rationalized within the HCT framework if educational mismatches 
were found to be a short run singularity (Sicherman, 1991; Alba-Ramírez, 1993), but 
there seems to be evidence supporting that workers remain overeducated for much 
longer time spells (Robst, 1995; Rubb, 2003; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; McGuin-
ness, 2003).
Concerning international evidence, the differential between the overeducated and 
the matched workers ranges between 12% (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000), 18% (Dolton 
and Silles, 2003) or 27% (Chevalier, 2003) for the United Kingdom, 13% for the 
United States (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) or 11% (Cohn and Kahn, 1995), 26% for 
the Netherlands (Groot, 1993) or 8% in Portugal (Kiker et al., 1997). There are also 
some authors supporting the argument that overeducated workers may incorporate 
less innate skills or abilities in their wage gaps. Others (Groot, 1996) find that the 
wage penalty for overeducated workers is related to tenure, which means that as time 
goes by the employers find out the real productivity of the workers and discriminate 
those with fewer abilities than the qualifications they possess.
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There are also other theories besides Human Capital Theory that explain the 
existence of overeducated workers. Carrier Mobility Theory (Galor and Sicherman, 
1990) considers an initial situation of overeducation for workers, which will gain 
experience and specific skills to gain higher occupation levels over time to finally 
match their qualification level to their occupation. Signaling Theory (Spence, 1973) 
assumes the existence of an excess of education as a signal to employers in order to 
be hired. Credential Hypothesis (van der Meer and Wielers, 1996) relies on the dif-
ficulty of the employers to measure the true individual’s productivity, thus using the 
educational credentials as a strong proxy for the potential worker’s productivity. In 
that case, individuals may acquire an excess of education in order to fight for a job 
with other candidates. Job Competition Theory (Thurow, 1975) states that unem-
ployed candidates for a given job are ranked in a hypothetical queue, so overeduca-
tion could be an optimal response in order to improve or maintain their position in 
the queue in order to get the job. Matching Theory (Jovanovic, 1979) assumes the 
existence of job’s misallocations by the existence of search costs and imperfect in-
formation.
One of the main difficulties arising from the analysis of overeducation is how 
to measure it. There are mainly three different methods commonly used. Some of 
them are based on the systematic evaluation of the jobs and their specific require-
ments (objective measures), others rely on the subjective perception of the workers 
about their potential mismatch (subjective measures) and the third type of overedu-
cation measurement is based on empiric analysis (statistic measures). As usual, all 
of them have advantages and disadvantages but the most frequent decision criterion 
is the availability of data and information. The objective measures rely on a me-
ticulous analysis of the jobs based on their difficulty, main characteristics, educa-
tion requirements or special abilities. In this case, the comparison of the education 
level of the workers and the characteristics of the jobs will determine whether a 
mismatch exists. This kind of analysis requires an exhaustive analysis. Even more, 
this process requires a continuous update of the list of occupations given the quick 
absorption of new technologies and its consequences on the  jobs’ characteristics. 
Moreover, not all the countries have such detailed and disaggregated information 
in order to perform this analysis. The OECD proposes an approximation for an ob-
jective and comparable measure of overeducation based on the ISCO classification 
of occupations and the ISCED classification of education and a correspondence 
between the occupations and the education level required, but this solution has also 
some limitations as it relies on the homogeneity of the educational profiles and the 
occupations between countries. If differences between countries in the require-
ments of the jobs are important, which is something very likely when working with 
a high level of aggregation in the definition of the different occupations, and the 
education systems are different, then the use of a common classification could be 
misleading.
The subjective method relies on the individuals’ opinion about their own mis-
match and the overeducated present usually higher dissatisfaction levels in the work-
place. It is important to notice that there is a type of overeducation commonly ac-
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cepted among individuals when they are satisfied with their jobs although they are 
not well matched with their formation because they usually consider education as a 
personal consumption good (from a vocational point perspective) or a social status 
component, but not an investment. There is also a trend towards an upward bias of 
overeducation, as individuals may exaggerate the requirements of their jobs (Peiró 
and Montalvo, 2008).
The statistical method is based on the observed adjustment within each oc-
cupation through the observation of the most frequent education level. Some au-
thors, like Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), prefer to take the mean of the years of 
education within each of the occupations, so that individuals above one standard 
deviation of the average years of education in a given occupation will be classi-
fied as overeducated and vice versa. However, these methods are based on the 
arbitrariness of using the standard deviation as a threshold for detecting overe-
ducation and the assumption that the occupation-education mismatch follows a 
normal distribution. In that case, if an occupation group had a high incidence of 
overeducated individuals, then the mean would be affected by this phenomenon 
thus underestimating its composition (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). Furthermore, 
according to Sicherman (1991), the classification of occupations may group jobs 
for which the educational requirements differ substantially and this effect may 
be reinforced as we move to a greater occupational aggregation. The statistical 
method is also very sensitive to the labour market situation (Hartog, 2000), in 
the sense that if there is a surplus of qualified workers then workers with a higher 
qualification than the one required for their jobs will be hired, so there would 
be an underestimation of the overeducation effect and viceversa. The first effect 
could arise in regions or countries in periods of general education improvements. 
Alternatively, other authors (Kiker et al., 1997) prefer to use the mode as an 
alternative to the mean. In that case, individuals with an education level higher 
than the modal within each occupation group will be overeducated and vice versa. 
This definition is supposed to be less sensitive to the existence of outliers in the 
educational distribution.
Unlike in any other Spanish analysis related to overeducation in which sub-
jective or statistical measures are used (Alba, 1993; Beneito et al., 1996; Alba 
and Blázquez, 2004; Budría and Moro-Egido, 2008; García-Montalvo and Peiró, 
2009; Nieto and Ramos, 2010) or the analysis focuses on young workers (Rahona, 
2008), in this paper we will use the objective method proposed by the OECD 
matching the educational and the occupational levels of the workers based on 
the data provided by the Spanish Living Conditions Survey . In this survey there 
are no subjective statements related to the education mismatch and regarding the 
regional analysis we preferred to use a more objective measure of overeducation 
consistent over time and less dependent on conjunctural circumstances rather than 
a statistical one like the mean or the mode. Other methods, like the overeducation, 
required education, and undereducation (ORU) rely on the years of education re-
quired to perform specific occupation, so that overeducation is defined as the sur-
plus of years and undereducation implies the opposite. We use a similar approach 
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relying on dummy variables for the different possible matching between education 
levels and occupations instead of years of education and center the attention on 
the group of employees which might be overeducated, thus not taking into account 
undereducation.
The ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) produced 
by the International Labour Organization can be used to distinguish the different 
qualifications and skills related to the education levels required to perform the jobs 
grouped by this classification (tables 1 and 2). The 1-digit educational and occupa-
tional groups are classified as high-skilled, intermediate or low-skilled depending 
on the capacities and abilities related to them and, finally, a correspondence table 
between occupations and education levels results from matching them together (ta-
ble 3).
Table 1. Conversion of ISCO-88 9 categories to 3 categories
Low-skilled Intermediate High-skilled
1. Legislators, senior officials and managers x
2. Professionals x
3. Technicians and associate professionals   x
4. Clerks x
5. Service and sales workers x
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers x
7. Craft and related trades workers x
8. Plant and machine operators, and assemblers  x  
9. Elementary occupations x
Source: OECD (2007).
Table 2. Conversion from ISCED 7 categories to 3 categories
 Low-skilled Intermediate
Skilled or  
highly skilled
0. Pre-primary education or preschool x
1. Primary education x
2. Lower secondary education x
3. Upper secondary education x
4. Post-secondary non-tertiary education x
5. First stage of tertiary education x
6. Second stage of tertiary education x
Source: OECD (2007).
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Table 3. Correspondence between ISCED education level and ISCO 
 employment level
 
ISCO employment level
Low-skilled Intermediate
Skilled  
or highly skilled
IS
CE
D
 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
le
v
el
Low-skilled Adjusted Under-qualified Under-qualified
Intermediate Over-qualified Adjusted Under-qualified
Skilled or highly skilled Over-qualified Over-qualified Adjusted
Source: OECD (2007).
From the previous table we can describe three different categories from the ad-
justment between the occupation groups and the education levels: overqualification, 
well-matched workers and underqualification. Overqualification arises for high edu-
cation (ISCED 5-6) and intermediate or low-skilled occupations (ISCO 4-9) or inter-
mediate education levels (ISCED 3-4) and low-skilled occupations (ISCO 9).As the 
purpose of this paper is to analyze the overeducation phenomenon, we will not take 
into account the population with low-skilled levels of education (ISCED 0-2) because 
this group cannot be overqualified. Thus, we will analyze the population with educa-
tion levels ISCED 3-4 (post-secondary education) and ISCED 5-6 (high education) 
which will be either adjusted or overqualified.
Following the OECD methodology for the overeducation measurement we can 
observe that the percentage of overeducated workers with medium and high educa-
tion is around 25% in Spain, whereas this percentage is much smaller for the EU 
(around 13%). In that sense, Spain is a special case in the European Union with one 
of the highest levels of overeducation jointly with Cyprus and followed by Ireland 
Figure 1. Overeducation. Spain and EU-27, 2000-2010  
(% of medium and high education workers)
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EU-27
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Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
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and the UK. The Spanish case could be explained in part by the fact that ISCED 5B 
is rarely found to be matched with ISCO 1-3 occupations. However, if we analyze 
overeducation in Spain only for employees with a university degree (ISCED 5A-6), 
this percentage sinks to 20%.
2.  Data and methodology
We use data from the 2004-2009 waves of the Spanish Living Conditions Survey 
(SLCS). The SLCS is a new source of statistical information in the Community en-
vironment that strengthens the current European statistical infrastructure in order to 
respond to the Commission’s needs to obtain initial information on the distribution 
of income and social exclusion in Europe, and acts as a base for the formulation of 
its social policy in different spheres, and to monitor the effects of these policies in the 
whole of the European Union (EU). Between 1994 and 2001, the European Union 
Household Panel (EUHP) survey satisfied these political needs. Nevertheless, given 
the need to update its content in view of the new demands, and to improve its func-
tioning (especially as regards the speed at which data is produced), the EUHP was 
replaced with the SLCS. Although persons of all ages are part of the target popula-
tion, not all persons are eligible to respond to the individual questionnaire. The popu-
lation under investigation (target population) is persons who are members of private 
households who live in main family dwellings, as well as said households. Although 
persons of all ages are part of the target population, not all persons are exhaustively 
researched since the only persons who can be selected for exhaustive investigation 
are those aged 16 or over on December 31st of the year prior to the interview. For 
each region (Autonomous Community) an independent sample that represents it is 
designed, due to one of the objectives of the survey being to facilitate regional data.
This survey contains personal and labour market characteristics, such as wage, 
hours worked, age, activity sector, occupation, if the employee supervises other em-
ployees, firm size, marital status and nationality, among other variables. Potential la-
bour experience may be estimated as the difference between the age of the employee 
and the age at which he declared to have finished his studies. Individuals are asked to 
report the maximum level of education that they have completed according to three 
categories based on the ISCED-97 classification (OECD, 2003): less than upper sec-
ondary (ISCED 0-2), upper secondary (ISCED 3-4) and tertiary education (ISCED 
5-6).Our sample consists of employees between 17 and 64 years old not working for 
the armed forces and reporting a maximum level of education equivalent to ISCED 
3-4 or ISCED 5-6 since workers with ISCED 0-2 cannot be overeducated according 
to our measure of overeducation. The hourly wage is calculated by dividing the gross 
monthly earnings by the hours usually worked per week multiplied by 4. Since we 
pool the observations for all the years, a set of dummies controls for a possible time 
trend and wages are corrected for inflation. Furthermore, we use sample weights pro-
vided by the SLCS to make the sample comparable to the population; all the standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity arising from the sample design. We account for 
all the Spanish regions except for Ceuta and Melilla.
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Table 4. Distribution of the employees of the SLCS survey by educational 
occupation groups classified by skills. Spain, 2004-2009
Occupation by skill level
Total
Low-skilled Intermediate
Skilled or 
 highly skilled
IS
CE
D
  
ed
uc
at
io
n 
le
v
el
Low-skilled 11.57 26.43 1.68 39.68
Intermediate 3.16 16.84 3.96 23.95
Skilled or highly skilled 1.19 13.16 22.02 36.37
Total 15.91 56.43 27.66 100.00
Source: SLCS and own calculations.
In Table 5 we report some descriptive statistics. Data from the SLCS confirm the 
existence of significant wage differentials between the Spanish regions, with mean 
hourly wages ranging from 9.1 euros in Canarias to 13.2 euros in País Vasco, which 
are almost 50% higher. This regional pattern is coherent with other statistic sources 
and usual among other economic development indicators. Madrid and the regions 
located in the north-east occupy the top positions in gross hourly wages, which is also 
what the SLCS shows relative to the educational levels: the percentage of employees 
with high education (ISCED 5-6) is higher than 45% in Madrid (45.9%), Navarra 
(47.3%) and País Vasco (53.4%). On the other hand, Murcia, Canarias and Baleares 
show percentages of less than 30%. Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Andalucía 
and Castilla-La Mancha have an amount of high educated employees near 30%. Oth-
er variables such as age or labour experience show more homogeneity.
Also the job’s characteristics are different between regions, as the percentage of 
employees in high-skilled occupations (ISCO 1-3) is around 40% in Madrid and 35% 
in País Vasco, whereas in other regions like Murcia or Canarias this percentage is 
22%. Also the percentage of non-skilled jobs (ISCO 9) is very high in Murcia (24%) 
and doubles the weight of these occupations in other regions. We can also observe 
that in Madrid, Cataluña and Aragon, jobs which entangle supervision tasks are much 
frequent than in Murcia, Galicia or Extremadura. Finally, the firm’s characteristics 
constitute a fundamental dimension in which inequalities are apparent between re-
gions. Madrid, País Vasco, Cantabria and Navarra show a higher presence of bigger 
firms (40%-50%), whilst in Murcia big firms barely arrive to 22%.
For this particular sample of the SLCS for the 2004-2009 period we find that a 
third of the employees with medium and high education are overeducated. This per-
centage is almost 37% in Navarra and 21.7% in Baleares. One of the main drawbacks 
of the education-occupation matching following the methodology proposed in table 3 
is the fact that it does not allow to relate specific degrees to specific occupations as 
it aims to capture this matching in a broader sense in order to enable international 
comparability. This should not be the case when analyzing a single country, or, as in 
our case, a regional performance, because of the occupation-education existing ho-
mogeneity. In our case, the availability of data did not allow us to go any further, as 
our database disaggregates occupation in the 9 commonly ISCO main-groups and the 
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education levels are also grouped in three main categories according to the 0-2, 3-4 
and 5-6 ISCED levels. Table 4 shows the distribution of the three educational levels 
of the SLCS for the years 2004 to 2009 by skilled groups.
As a preliminary exercise we estimate the effect of the worker’s and the work-
place’s characteristics on the gross hourly wage, adding also a dummy variable for 
the effect of being overeducated, using OLS techniques through a Mincerian (Mincer, 
1974) semi-logarithmic wage equation:
y X over= + + +α β γ' ( )ε 1
where α is the intercept term, X is a vector of independent variables measuring a 
range of individual and job characteristics such as marital status, level of education 
(equal to one for high education and equal to zero for post-secondary education), 
gender, potential labour market experience calculated as the difference between the 
year of the survey and the year that the individuals finished their formal studies, a 
second degree polynomial in labour market experience, supervising other employees, 
part-time work, etc, ε is the residual term and there is also dummy variable (over) that 
takes the value of one if the worker is overeducated and zero if the worker is well-
matched. Since we pool the observations for all the years, we use a set of dummies 
controls for a possible time trend. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
average hourly wage of each employee. We also apply the Gardeazabal and Ugidos 
(2004) identification restriction in order to obtain the estimation effects for the omitted 
reference for all the categorical variables. The results for the subset of employees 
with upper secondary or tertiary education, including also occupational categories 
in column 1, are shown in table 6. Ceteris paribus, gross hourly wages increase with 
the educational level, the employee’s potential experience and the firm’s size and is 
also positively associated with performing supervision tasks and working in skilled 
occupations (ISCO 1-3). On the contrary it is significantly smaller for women, foreign 
workers and part-time workers. Finally, the economic activity and the region have a 
significant influence on wages (with higher wages in the financial sector, education 
or health, and regions such as País Vasco and Navarra).
Column 2 presents the results for the estimation including the dummy variable 
for overeducation, defined following the correspondence between the education level 
and the occupation group (table 3), thus excluding the ISCO dummies for the occupa-
tion groups. The coefficients are very similar for all variables to the ones estimated 
in column 1, although it is important to remark the positive increase of education, 
reflecting the fact that the occupation level depends positively on the education of 
the individuals, which is also an important component of the returns to education. 
The effect of being overeducated is significant and negative, reflecting ceteris pari-
bus a decrease of –25% on the gross hourly wage, a very high cost associated with 
this problem. If mismatched employees had jobs suited to their qualifications there 
would be a substantial increase in their productivity and given the high levels of 
overqualification in Spain, this would also increase the national and regional labour 
productivity. The time dummies included in the regression and all the econometric 
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Table 6. OLS regression for the log hourly wage
Total (1) Total (2)
ISCED 5-6 0.101 *** 0.318 ***
Experience
Experiencie2
0.015
0.000
***
***
0.015
0.000
***
***
Female
Foreign
Married
Supervision
Part–time work
–0.111
–0.117
0.090
0.123
–0.048
***
***
***
***
**
–0.102
–0.128
0.095
0.154
–0.052
***
***
***
***
** 
1-10 employees
11-19 employees
19-49 employees
50 or more employees
–0.082
–0.035
0.031
0.086
 
***
***
***
–0.089
–0.028
0.027
0.089
 
** 
** 
***
Agriculture, cattle & fishing
Extr. ind., manuf, prod. & distrib.
Construction
Trade & repair
Hotels & restaurants
Transportation, storage & repair
Financial intermediation
Real estate, renting & business act.
Public adm. & defence; comp. ss. 
Education
Health & vet. act, social service
Other social activities, etc
–0.121
–0.026
–0.055
–0.071
–0.076
–0.043
0.183
–0.074
0.160
0.149
0.068
–0.096
 
*
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
–0.130
–0.046
–0.073
–0.103
–0.110
–0.046
0.191
–0.072
0.166
0.229
0.083
–0.090
 
***
***
***
***
** 
***
***
***
***
***
***
ISCO 1: Managers
ISCO 2: Professionals
ISCO 3: Technicians & ass.  professionals
ISCO 4: Clerical support workers
ISCO 5: Service and sales workers
ISCO 6: Skilled agric., forestry and fishery workers
ISCO 7: Craft and related trades workers
ISCO 8: Plant and machine operators, & assemblers
ISCO 9: Elementary occupations
0.351
0.286
0.066
–0.046
–0.115
–0.133
–0.125
–0.092
–0.192
 
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Andalucía
Aragón
Asturias
Baleares
Castilla y León
Castilla-La Mancha
C. Valenciana
Canarias
Cantabria
Cataluña
Extremadura
Galicia
La Rioja
Madrid
Murcia
Navarra
País Vasco
–0.069
0.032
–0.002
0.104
–0.012
0.020
–0.043
–0.079
–0.006
0.045
–0.080
–0.091
–0.001
0.009
–0.040
0.120
0.094
***
**
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
–0.066
0.026
–0.007
0.117
–0.027
0.024
–0.033
–0.077
–0.020
0.049
–0.076
–0.097
–0.003
0.016
–0.040
0.128
0.086
 
   
   
***
   
   
*  
***
   
***
** 
***
   
   
*  
***
***
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analysis performed in the next sections should capture any inflation or trend effects 
or any break due to the economic crisis after 2007. As it can be seen, as time goes by 
their values are more positive.
These results are broadly consistent with the empirical literature on this topic for 
the Spanish case. The wage penalty estimated for self-assessed overeducated work-
ers was –9% according to Budría and Moro-Egido (2007), –17% according to Alba 
(1993) or, using a strict definition of subjective overeducation, –4% according to 
Aguilar and García-Crespo (2008).Evidence about a wage penalty for overeducat-
ed workers with respect to workers having a job matching their qualifications was 
also found in Nieto and Ramos (2010). Rahona et al. (2010) find that overeducated 
workers have a relative impact with respect to adjusted workers of –3.2 percentage 
points on the rate of return of years of schooling for the years of overeducation. In 
order to compare these results, we must take into account that they are related to dif-
ferent overeducation definitions (self-assessment, mean, mode...), different surveys 
(PHOGUE, ECBC, EES) or different analytical tools (ORU, panel, quantile...) to the 
ones used in our paper.
In Spain there are no formal barriers to labour mobility, but it is useful to ana-
lyze each regional labour market performance separately. The results for estimating 
a separate regression for each region as in table 6-column 2 are shown in table 7. 
Some of them are qualitatively similar: positive effect of education, firm’s size and 
supervision tasks; negative effect on being a woman, a foreigner, etc. However, there 
are also differences in the magnitude and relevance of the effects between regions. 
Regional labour markets seem to pay some employee’s characteristics such as educa-
tion, gender, nationality or experience differently. Something similar happens with 
the job’s and firm’s characteristics.
In particular, being overeducated has a significant and negative effect over the 
gross hourly wage in all regions, but this effect is heterogeneous across the Spanish 
territory. The overeducation penalty is -17.5% in Cataluña, whereas in Castilla-La 
Table 6. (cont.)
Total (1) Total (2)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
–0.115
–0.068
0.027
0.034
0.046
0.076
***
***
***
***
***
–0.115
–0.067
0.028
0.033
0.044
0.078
***
***
***
***
***
Overeducated –0.250 ***
Constant 2.041 *** 1.997 ***
Obs. 34,169  34,169
R2 0.541 0.511
Adjusted R2 0.540 0.511
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Mancha this wage gap is -34.3%. In some cases, the effect of being overeducated 
almost compensates (País Vasco, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha, Baleares, Aragón) or 
even exceeds (Murcia) the effect of attaining higher levels of education over upper 
secondary education. These results show that in order to assess the regional overedu-
cation differences in Spain, it is not enough to consider the amount of mismatched 
workers or their weight on the total employment. Its ultimate impact in terms of pro-
ductivity and economic performance may be influenced by the characteristics of the 
workers and the regional productive structure. The same percentage of overeducation 
may be more or less important depending on these factors. The following sections 
will analyze these issues.
3.  Quantile regression approach
The quantile regression method allows to estimate the impact of overeducation 
not only on the mean of the wage distribution as in the standard OLS technique, but 
to estimate the possible different impacts of overeducation over different points of 
the wage distribution, thus helping us to understand the existence of differences in re-
turns among employees with different levels of unobserved ability, as all of them hold 
an equivalent observable ability (education level). For the technique to be useful we 
require there to be sufficient variation in the levels of the exogenous variables across 
the quantiles in order to obtain statistically significant estimations. The empirical 
results suggest that the data used here is sufficient to meet that condition.
The QR model can be formally written as follows (see Buchinsky, 1994):
ln (ln ) (w X with Quant w X Xi i q qi q i i i q= + =β βε 2)
Where Xi is the vector of exogenous variables and βq is the vector of parameters. 
Quant w Xq i i(ln ) denotes the qth conditional quantile of ln given X. The qth regres-
sion quantile, 0 < q < 1, is defined as a solution to the problem:
min (ln ) ( )β ρ β∈ −{ }R q i i qk w XΣ 3
where the check function ρq (z) = qz if z ≥ 0 or ρq (z) = (q – 1)z if z < 0. This problem 
is solved using linear programming methods, where standard errors for the vector of 
coefficients are obtained using the bootstrap method described in Buchinsky (1998). 
It must be noted that if the underlying model were a location model, that is, changes 
in the explanatory variables producing changes only in the location, not in the shape, 
of the conditional wage distribution, then all the slope coefficients would be the same 
for all p.
This analysis will allow us to determine if it is unobservable characteristics such 
as innate ability of personal motivation which are affecting earnings and producti-
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vity or it is more due to situations of apparent educational mismatch. If unobserv-
able characteristics were important, the negative effect of being overeducated should 
be bigger in the lower part of the wage distribution where other kind of abilities 
could not compensate this mismatch. If we observe the opposite phenomenon, then 
we could conclude that unobservable characteristics are not as relevant as the pure 
education-occupation mismatch.
Tables 8 and 9 show the gross hourly wages for the well-matched and the overe-
ducated employees across the wage distribution in Spain and the Spanish regions for 
the workers with at least upper secondary education (ISCED 3-6) and the workers 
with high education (ISCED 5-6). For both groups the wage gap grows as we move to 
higher percentiles. As it can be seen, the range of variation of wages between regions 
is higher as we move to the upper part of the wage distribution. These differences are 
slightly smaller for workers with tertiary education for higher deciles but, anyway, 
they are also higher in the lower part of the wage distribution.
Table 8. Wage differences across the wage distribution. Spain.  
Pool 2004-2009 (euros 2009)
Deciles
Overqualif. 
(ISCED 3-6)
Adjusted 
(ISCED 3-6)
Overqualif. / 
Adjusted (%)
Overqualif. 
(ISCED 5-6)
Adjusted 
(ISCED 5-6)
Overqualif. / 
Adjusted (%)
10  5.33  6.14 86.78  5.54  8.08 68.49
20  6.22  7.49 83.09  6.51 10.11 64.43
30  7.01  8.84 79.38  7.36 11.96 61.55
40  7.79 10.19 76.48  8.22 13.80 59.54
50  8.66 11.73 73.86  9.13 15.56 58.72
60  9.65 13.62 70.85 10.18 17.45 58.33
70 10.89 15.83 68.78 11.50 19.45 59.14
80 12.58 18.70 67.29 13.28 21.97 60.42
90 15.67 22.83 68.63 16.41 26.01 63.08
Diff. 90-10 10.33 16.68 61.94 10.87 17.93 60.64
As a next step we analyze whether the matched-mismatched wage differential 
remains stable across the wage distribution controlling for the individual’s and firm’s 
characteristics. Table 10 presents the coefficients for the overeducation dummy from 
the 10th to the 90th percentiles of hourly income. The results for Spain (last row of 
table 10) confirm the negative effect across the wage distribution, which is more 
intensive in the highest percentiles (this effects is –19.2% in the 10th percentile and 
–30.1% in the 90th percentile, a difference of 11 percentage points). This pattern is 
similar in the Spanish regions except for Cantabria, and the 90th-10th difference is 
higher than 18 percentage points in Galicia, La Rioja and País Vasco.
Table 11 shows the overeducation coefficients obtained for the employees with 
tertiary education.The results are similar than the ones shown in table 10 but the 
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Table 9. Gross hourly wage for the overeducated and matched employees  
across the wage distribution
A) ISCED 3-6  B) ISCED 5-6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 90-10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 90-10
Overeducated Overeducated
Andalucía 5.0 5.8 6.5 7.1 7.9 8.7 9.9 11.6 14.3 9.3 Andalucía 5.3 6.1 6.9 7.6 8.4 9.3 10.5 12.5 15.5 10.2
Aragón 6.0 7.0 7.8 8.4 9.3 10.2 11.7 13.2 16.8 10.8 Aragón 6.4 7.3 8.1 8.9 9.8 10.8 12.0 13.9 17.5 11.1
Asturias 4.9 6.2 6.8 7.6 8.9 10.0 11.4 13.2 16.8 11.9 Asturias 5.3 6.4 7.0 8.0 9.3 10.3 12.0 14.0 17.9 12.6
Baleares 5.7 6.7 7.3 7.9 8.8 9.6 11.4 12.6 15.0 9.3 Baleares 6.0 6.9 7.6 8.3 9.3 10.4 11.9 13.2 16.3 10.4
C. y León 5.3 6.1 7.0 7.8 8.6 9.8 11.1 13.0 15.7 10.4 C. y León 5.5 6.3 7.3 8.2 9.0 10.4 11.7 13.6 16.0 10.5
C.-La Mancha 5.2 6.2 7.1 7.8 8.7 9.5 10.9 12.5 15.0 9.8 C.-La Mancha 5.5 6.5 7.3 8.2 9.0 10.0 11.3 13.1 15.3 9.8
C. Valenciana 5.2 6.0 6.6 7.2 7.8 8.6 9.5 10.9 13.1 7.9 C. Valenciana 5.4 6.2 7.0 7.5 8.3 9.1 10.1 11.6 13.9 8.4
Canarias 4.7 5.5 6.1 6.7 7.2 8.0 8.7 9.8 12.1 7.5 Canarias 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.8 7.5 8.3 9.2 10.3 12.7 7.8
Cantabria 5.0 6.1 7.0 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.9 13.0 17.5 12.4 Cantabria 5.5 6.3 7.3 8.1 8.9 10.0 11.7 14.3 18.0 12.5
Cataluña 5.6 6.8 7.4 8.4 9.5 10.7 11.9 13.7 17.1 11.5 Cataluña 5.9 6.9 7.9 9.0 10.2 11.4 12.6 14.6 18.2 12.3
Extremadura 4.7 5.3 6.1 6.7 7.4 8.0 9.1 10.4 14.1 9.4 Extremadura 4.8 5.6 6.3 6.9 7.4 8.1 9.5 11.2 15.0 10.2
Galicia 4.6 5.4 6.2 6.8 7.4 8.2 9.1 10.5 12.7 8.1 Galicia 4.7 5.6 6.3 6.9 7.6 8.5 9.5 10.9 13.1 8.4
La Rioja 5.4 6.2 7.0 7.6 8.2 9.1 9.7 11.0 13.2 7.8 La Rioja 5.6 6.5 7.2 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.4 14.1 8.5
Madrid 5.5 6.4 7.2 8.2 9.0 10.0 11.5 13.4 16.9 11.4 Madrid 5.8 6.9 7.9 8.8 9.7 10.9 12.3 14.4 18.0 12.2
Murcia 5.2 6.0 6.6 7.1 7.9 8.7 9.6 10.7 13.5 8.3 Murcia 5.4 6.2 6.8 7.5 8.7 9.4 10.2 11.3 14.3 8.9
Navarra 6.3 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.4 11.3 12.8 14.7 16.8 10.4 Navarra 6.5 7.8 8.7 9.7 10.6 11.7 13.1 15.1 17.0 10.5
País Vasco 6.4 7.8 8.6 9.5 10.4 11.4 12.8 14.5 17.8 11.5 País Vasco 6.8 8.0 8.8 9.7 10.6 11.8 13.1 14.9 18.2 11.3
Range. Var. 1.7 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.7 5.0 Range. Var. 2.1 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.8 5.5 4.8
A) ISCED 3-6  B) ISCED 5-6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 90-10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 90-10
Matched Matched
Andalucía 5.9 7.1 8.5 9.9 11.5 13.3 15.6 18.6 22.4 16.5 Andalucía 7.8 9.7 11.6 13.6 15.3 17.4 19.3 21.6 24.8 17.0
Aragón 6.7 8.0 9.3 10.7 12.3 14.3 16.3 18.6 22.7 16.0 Aragón 8.9 10.9 12.6 14.6 16.2 17.7 19.3 21.8 25.4 16.5
Asturias 5.8 7.0 8.4 9.8 11.4 13.4 15.9 19.0 23.5 17.7 Asturias 7.7 10.3 12.3 14.4 16.0 17.9 20.2 22.7 27.3 19.6
Baleares 6.7 8.0 9.3 10.8 12.4 14.7 16.9 19.5 23.2 16.5 Baleares 9.8 11.9 13.6 15.7 17.1 18.8 20.8 23.0 27.6 17.8
C. y León 6.2 7.5 8.7 10.3 11.7 13.5 15.8 18.7 22.5 16.3 C. y León 7.7 9.8 11.7 13.5 15.6 17.7 19.9 21.9 25.4 17.7
C.-La Mancha 6.1 7.5 8.8 10.0 11.6 13.7 16.0 19.3 23.8 17.6 C.-La Mancha 7.7 9.7 11.4 13.7 15.7 17.6 19.8 22.9 27.1 19.3
C. Valenciana 5.8 6.9 8.1 9.3 10.5 12.3 14.5 17.1 20.3 14.5 C. Valenciana 7.5 9.5 11.1 12.8 14.5 16.2 18.0 19.8 22.6 15.1
Canarias 5.3 6.3 7.3 8.6 10.0 12.0 14.8 17.6 22.0 16.7 Canarias 7.3 9.5 11.1 13.5 15.5 17.3 19.4 21.8 24.9 17.6
Cantabria 6.1 7.4 8.7 10.6 12.4 14.4 16.2 19.0 23.9 17.8 Cantabria 7.0 9.8 12.4 14.3 15.9 17.7 19.5 21.9 26.9 19.8
Cataluña 6.8 8.3 9.3 10.6 12.1 13.9 16.0 18.9 23.0 16.2 Cataluña 8.6 10.4 11.9 13.8 15.3 17.4 19.4 22.0 26.2 17.6
Extremadura 5.3 6.8 8.2 9.6 11.3 13.3 15.6 19.0 22.9 17.6 Extremadura 7.7 9.8 11.8 13.8 15.4 17.6 19.8 22.1 25.8 18.1
Galicia 5.3 6.4 7.5 8.8 10.2 12.0 14.2 17.0 21.8 16.5 Galicia 6.9 8.9 10.7 12.9 14.7 16.3 18.3 21.2 25.4 18.6
La Rioja 6.2 7.0 8.2 9.4 10.4 11.9 13.9 16.6 21.5 15.3 La Rioja 7.8 9.8 11.0 12.7 14.4 15.8 18.1 21.1 24.0 16.2
Madrid 6.5 8.1 9.7 11.2 12.9 14.6 16.7 19.7 24.3 17.9 Madrid 8.5 10.5 12.2 13.8 15.6 17.4 19.5 22.5 27.8 19.3
Murcia 5.6 7.0 8.2 9.2 10.6 12.4 14.5 17.3 21.1 15.4 Murcia 8.1 10.0 12.0 13.7 15.4 16.9 18.6 21.0 23.7 15.6
Navarra 7.2 8.6 10.0 11.3 12.9 15.0 17.4 20.2 24.1 16.9 Navarra 9.0 11.1 12.7 14.9 17.3 19.1 20.9 23.6 27.6 18.6
País Vasco 7.7 9.2 10.6 12.1 13.9 15.7 17.8 20.9 25.9 18.2 País Vasco 8.9 10.8 12.8 14.4 16.0 18.0 20.6 23.9 27.8 18.9
Range. Var. 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.2 5.7 3.8 Range. Var. 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.4 2.9 4.1 5.3 4.8
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magnitude of the effect is much higher now. For Spain, the effect of being overedu-
cated over the gross hourly wage is –20.9% in the 10th percentile and –36.4% in the 
90th percentile, which amounts to a difference of 15.5 percentage points. In this case 
Cantabria is also a special case and does not follow the general pattern of intensifica-
tion of the wage penalty across the wage distribution. Differences between the 90th 
and the 10th percentile are higher than 20 percentage points in Galicia, Andalucía and 
País Vasco. Moreover, the overeducation effect for the 90th percentile is higher than 
40% in five regions and no smaller than 26% for all of them.
These results suggest that the importance of the unobservable characteristics is 
not the main issue concerning the wage differentials related to overeducation: the 
overeducation indicator is reflecting a genuine mismatch with significant effects on 
the regional productivity.
4.  Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) divides the 
wage differential between two groups of workers (by sex, race, etc.) in a counterfac-
tual framework. This decomposition allows disentangling the part of the differential 
due to differences in the characteristics of the individuals (which is usually captured 
by simple OLS regression) and the part due to differences in the way the labour mar-
Table 9. (cont.)
A) ISCED 3-6  B) ISCED 5-6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 90-10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 90-10
Difference between overeducated and matched employees Difference between overeducated and matched employees
Andalucía –0.9 –1.4 –2.0 –2.7 –3.6 –4.5 –5.7 –7.0 –8.1 –7.2 Andalucía –2.5 –3.6 –4.8 –6.0 –6.9 –8.0 –8.8 –9.1 –9.3 –6.9
Aragón –0.7 –1.0 –1.6 –2.2 –3.1 –4.0 –4.6 –5.3 –5.8 –5.2 Aragón –2.4 –3.6 –4.5 –5.6 –6.3 –6.9 –7.3 –7.9 –7.8 –5.4
Asturias –0.9 –0.9 –1.6 –2.2 –2.5 –3.4 –4.5 –5.8 –6.6 –5.8 Asturias –2.4 –3.9 –5.4 –6.4 –6.7 –7.6 –8.2 –8.7 –9.3 –7.0
Baleares –0.9 –1.3 –2.1 –2.8 –3.7 –5.0 –5.5 –6.9 –8.2 –7.2 Baleares –3.8 –5.0 –5.9 –7.4 –7.8 –8.5 –8.9 –9.8 –11.3 –7.5
C. y León –0.9 –1.3 –1.7 –2.5 –3.2 –3.6 –4.7 –5.7 –6.8 –5.9 C. y León –2.2 –3.5 –4.4 –5.3 –6.5 –7.3 –8.3 –8.3 –9.4 –7.2
C.-La Mancha –0.9 –1.2 –1.7 –2.2 –2.9 –4.2 –5.1 –6.8 –8.8 –7.9 C.-La Mancha –2.2 –3.2 –4.1 –5.6 –6.7 –7.6 –8.5 –9.8 –11.7 –9.5
C. Valenciana –0.6 –1.0 –1.5 –2.1 –2.7 –3.8 –5.0 –6.2 –7.1 –6.5 C. Valenciana –2.1 –3.3 –4.1 –5.2 –6.2 –7.2 –7.9 –8.3 –8.7 –6.6
Canarias –0.6 –0.7 –1.2 –1.9 –2.8 –4.0 –6.0 –7.8 –9.9 –9.2 Canarias –2.4 –3.9 –4.9 –6.7 –8.0 –9.0 –10.2 –11.5 –12.2 –9.7
Cantabria –1.0 –1.3 –1.8 –3.1 –4.0 –4.7 –5.3 –6.0 –6.4 –5.4 Cantabria –1.5 –3.5 –5.1 –6.3 –6.9 –7.7 –7.8 –7.6 –8.9 –7.3
Cataluña –1.2 –1.5 –1.9 –2.2 –2.6 –3.2 –4.1 –5.2 –5.9 –4.7 Cataluña –2.7 –3.4 –4.0 –4.8 –5.1 –6.0 –6.8 –7.5 –8.0 –5.3
Extremadura –0.6 –1.5 –2.1 –2.9 –3.9 –5.2 –6.6 –8.6 –8.8 –8.2 Extremadura –2.9 –4.2 –5.5 –6.9 –7.9 –9.5 –10.3 –10.9 –10.8 –7.9
Galicia –0.7 –0.9 –1.3 –2.0 –2.8 –3.8 –5.1 –6.5 –9.1 –8.4 Galicia –2.1 –3.3 –4.4 –5.9 –7.1 –7.8 –8.8 –10.3 –12.3 –10.2
La Rioja –0.7 –0.8 –1.2 –1.8 –2.2 –2.8 –4.2 –5.6 –8.3 –7.6 La Rioja –2.2 –3.3 –3.8 –4.8 –5.8 –6.4 –7.9 –9.7 –9.9 –7.7
Madrid –1.0 –1.7 –2.5 –3.0 –3.8 –4.5 –5.2 –6.3 –7.4 –6.5 Madrid –2.7 –3.6 –4.3 –5.0 –5.8 –6.5 –7.2 –8.1 –9.8 –7.1
Murcia –0.4 –1.0 –1.6 –2.1 –2.7 –3.6 –4.9 –6.6 –7.5 –7.1 Murcia –2.7 –3.8 –5.1 –6.2 –6.7 –7.5 –8.4 –9.7 –9.4 –6.6
Navarra –0.9 –1.0 –1.6 –2.0 –2.5 –3.6 –4.6 –5.5 –7.3 –6.4 Navarra –2.5 –3.3 –4.0 –5.1 –6.7 –7.5 –7.8 –8.5 –10.6 –8.1
País Vasco –1.3 –1.3 –2.0 –2.6 –3.4 –4.3 –4.9 –6.4 –8.1 –6.7 País Vasco –2.1 –2.8 –4.0 –4.8 –5.4 –6.2 –7.5 –9.0 –9.6 –7.6
Range. Var. 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.4 2.5 3.4 4.0 4.6 Range. Var. 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.9 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.9
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ket values these characteristics. This last part could be accounted as a measure for 
discrimination or differences due to unobserved predictors.
This decomposition needs two groups (we will use «O» for overeducated and 
«M» for well-matched employees), an outcome variable Y (the log hourly wage), 
and a set of predictors relating individual and firm characteristics (with the same 
specification as for the initial OLS analysis from the previous section: education, 
sex, immigrant condition, activity sector, etc.). This decomposition tries to answer 
the question on how much of the mean outcome difference R = E(YM) − E(YO), where 
E(Y) denotes the expected value of the log hourly wage, is accounted for by group 
differences in the predictors based on the linear model:
Y X E A Bµ µ µ µ µβ µ= = ∈+ ε ε, ( ) , { , } ( )0 4
where X is a vector containing the predictors and a constant, β contains the slope 
parameters and the intercept, and ε is the error:
R E Y E Y E X E XM O M M O O= − = −( ) ( ) ( )' ( )' ( )β β 5
since E(βµ) and E(εµ) = 0, which can be rearranged as follows (see Jann, 2008):
R E X E X E X E X E XM O O O M O M= − + − + −[ ( ) ( )]' ( )'( ) [ ( ) (β β β O M O)]'( ) ( )β β− 6
This is a «three-fold» decomposition, as the differential can be divided in three 
components: R = E + C + I.
The first component amounts to the part due to group differences in the predic-
tors (the «endowments effect»). The second component measures the contribution of 
differences in the coefficients (including differences in the intercept). The third com-
ponent is an interaction term which takes into account the existence of simultaneous 
differences in both endowments and coefficients.
The previous decomposition is formulated from the viewpoint of the overedu-
cated group (O). We can see that the group differences in the predictors are weighted 
by the coefficients of the overeducated to determine the endowments effect (E). In 
other words, the E component measures the expected change in the overqualified’s 
mean outcome, if overeducated had the same characteristics of the well-matched 
(M) employees. Moreover, for the second component (C) the differences in coef-
ficients are weighted by the overeducated mean characteristics. That is, the second 
component measures the expected change in the overeducated’s mean outcome, if 
they had the well-matched coefficients (betas). Thus, the differential can also be 
expressed from the viewpoint of the well-matched (reverse three-fold decompo-
sition):
R E X E X E X E X E XM O M M M O M= − + − − −[ ( ) ( )]' ( )'( ) [ ( ) (β β β O M O)]'( ) ( )β β− 7
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In order to account for both possibilities we take the average and the interaction 
effect disappears:
R R R E X E X E XM O O O M O= + = − + −12 12 12 [ ( ) ( )]' ( )'( )β β β +
− −  + −[ ( ) ( )]' ( ) [ ( ) (E X E X E X E XM O M O M Oβ β 12 )]' ( )
[ ( )' ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
β
β β
M
M M O M OE X E X E X
+
− − −
8
' ( )β βM O− 
In the previous sections we have found that the situations of apparent mismatch 
between the education levels of the employees and the requirements of their occu-
pations are very common in the Spanish regions. We have also found that there is a 
substantial impact of overeducation in the labour productivity of the Spanish regions 
and this overeducation seems to be a situation of genuine mismatch and not the result 
of unobservable characteristics of the employees.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition allows us to further analyze the factors de-
termining the negative effect of overeducation in the Spanish regions. Results from 
OLS regressions (tables 5 and 6) showed the importance of several personal charac-
teristics, as well as characteristics of the types of job and the firms, and the different 
influence of these variables across the Spanish regions. With this technique we can 
separate out the wage differential between the overeducated and the well-matched 
employees into differences in the average individual’s and job’s characteristics be-
tween these two groups of workers and differences in the returns to these character-
istics for each region.
Table 12 shows the results of the decomposition for workers with at least up-
per secondary education. As it can be seen, differences between the overeducated 
and the well-matched workers are mainly due to differences of the effect of these 
characteristics in the wage determination for these two types of workers (as much as 
90% is due to the coefficients effect), usually through the effect of how experience is 
valued by the labour market. In Spain, of the 28% difference between overqualified 
and well-matched employees, 25 percentage points correspond to the coefficients 
effect, whereas only 3 percentage points correspond to the endowments effect. Only 
in Baleares, Andalucía, Canarias, Cantabria and La Rioja the endowments effect has 
some relevance, contributing between a 20% and a 54% to the negative wage effect 
of being overeducated.
If we analyze only the workers with tertiary education (table 13), the results 
are similar but not as accentuated. First we can observe that the wage gap is 
much bigger (44% for Spain instead of 28%). Moreover, the coefficients effect 
is also more relevant (accounting for a 73% in Spain) than the characteristics 
effect (27%). We can observe this pattern in all the Spanish regions except for 
Baleares. However, if we compare these results with the ones in table 12 we can 
see that the endowments effect is generally bigger and significant and represents 
more than a quarter of the total wage differential. This is something that can be 
explained by the fact that matched workers with tertiary education have an ad-
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vantage with respect to overeducated workers in the sense that they have a higher 
average potential experience (17 years versus 14.6 years for the overeducated), 
have higher positions of supervision (39% versus 24% for the overeducated) and 
part-time work is also less frequent among well-matched workers. We can also 
observe from tables 12 and 131that both the characteristics and the coefficients 
effects tend to generate different results regarding the final effect of overeduca-
tion across regions in Spain, thus contributing to regional differences in terms 
of wages, productivity and economic performance. Generally, the variables that 
affect the endowments part of the decomposition are potential experience and 
responsibility and experience has also a very high impact in the coefficients part 
of the decomposition. These results on the wage penalty for overeducation across 
regions are in line with previous analyses of the total wage differences across 
regions across Spanish regions. García and Molina (2002) found a similar effect 
1 Results are similar to a pooled two-fold decomposition between explained and unexplained char-
acteristics.
Table 12. Oaxaca decomposition (mean of the Oaxaca and the reverse Oaxaca 
decomposition). Population with ISCED 3-4 or ISCED 5-6 education.  
Pool 2004-2009 1
Adjusted 
(lnw)
Overqualif. 
(lnw)
Difference
Endowments 
effect
Coefficients 
effect
%  
Endow.
%  
Coeff.
Andalucía 2.50 2.17 0.33 0.10 ** 0.23 *** 30.58 69.42
Aragón 2.55 2.31 0.24 –0.03 0.26 *** –11.12 111.12
Asturias 2.54 2.32 0.22 –0.07 0.29 *** –31.58 131.58
Baleares 2.61 2.38 0.23 0.12 0.11 ** 54.01 45.99
Castilla y León 2.50 2.28 0.23 –0.01 0.23 *** –3.43 103.43
Castilla-La Mancha 2.67 2.25 0.42 0.01 0.41 *** 3.02 96.98
C. Valenciana 2.51 2.20 0.31 0.02 0.29 *** 5.35 94.65
Canarias 2.49 2.12 0.37 0.09 0.27 *** 24.90 75.09
Cantabria 2.53 2.23 0.30 0.09 0.20 *** 31.00 69.00
Cataluña 2.56 2.35 0.21 0.03 0.18 *** 16.01 84.00
Extremadura 2.44 2.26 0.17 –0.12 0.30 *** –70.30 170.29
Galicia 2.39 2.15 0.24 –0.05 0.30 *** –21.23 121.23
La Rioja 2.49 2.21 0.28 0.06 0.22 *** 22.94 77.06
Madrid 2.61 2.33 0.29 0.03 0.26 *** 10.46 89.54
Murcia 2.51 2.23 0.28 –0.05 0.33 *** –17.31 117.31
Navarra 2.68 2.46 0.22 –0.01 0.23 *** –5.09 105.09
País Vasco 2.73 2.43 0.30 0.04 0.26 *** 12.52 87.48
Total 2.56 2.28 0.28 0.03 ** 0.25 *** 9.76 90.24
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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of the endowments and coefficients component. Their results show higher differ-
ences for the coefficients effect (remuneration to characteristics) in the North and 
the East, related to variables with greater influence such as seniority, university 
level of education, activity sector, supervision tasks and occupation. Motellón 
et al. (2011) find significant regional differences in characteristics and coeffi-
cients and their impact on total wage differentials. Following Serrano (2002), 
these authors suggest that wage differentials due to differences in the returns 
to characteristics may explain the existence of inefficient regional labour mar-
kets. They also argue that a regional homogeneity in the wage distribution could 
only be possible through a simultaneous equalization of the worker’s, firm’s and 
workplaces’ characteristics and the returns to these characteristics. A further im-
provement for further research would be to incorporate a quantile analysis in the 
Oaxaca-Blinder framework to improve comparisons with the mean and incorpo-
rate the whole distribution to compare between regions that show important signs 
of heterogeneity, especially because of the lack of explicit information in our data 
source about unobservable ability.
Table 13. Oaxaca decomposition (mean of the Oaxaca and the reverse Oaxaca 
decomposition). Population with ISCED 5-6 education.  
Pool 2004-2009
Adjusted 
(lnw)
Overqualif. 
(lnw)
Difference
Endowments 
effect
Coefficients 
effect
%  
Endow.
%  
Coeff.
Andalucía 2.71 2.25 0.46 0.20 *** 0.26 *** 44.05 55.95
Aragón 2.81 2.34 0.47 0.09 ** 0.38 *** 18.90 81.10
Asturias 2.82 2.37 0.45 –0.07 * 0.52 *** –15.51 115.51
Baleares 2.85 2.41 0.44 0.30 *** 0.14 67.53 32.47
Castilla y León 2.78 2.29 0.49 0.13 *** 0.36 ** 25.83 74.17
Castilla-La Mancha 2.90 2.31 0.59 0.14 *** 0.45 *** 24.14 75.86
C. Valenciana 2.73 2.25 0.49 0.19 *** 0.30 *** 38.45 61.55
Canarias 2.80 2.13 0.67 0.23 *** 0.43 *** 35.12 64.88
Cantabria 2.74 2.26 0.47 0.07 0.41 *** 13.81 86.19
Cataluña 2.76 2.37 0.38 0.10 *** 0.28 *** 25.84 74.16
Extremadura 2.70 2.32 0.38 0.11 0.27 *** 28.12 71.88
Galicia 2.65 2.21 0.44 0.09 ** 0.35 *** 20.17 79.83
La Rioja 2.68 2.27 0.40 0.14 *** 0.26 *** 34.44 65.56
Madrid 2.76 2.38 0.38 0.10 *** 0.28 *** 25.55 74.45
Murcia 2.72 2.37 0.34 –0.01 0.36 *** –4.08 104.08
Navarra 2.80 2.47 0.34 0.01 *** 0.33 *** 2.01 97.99
País Vasco 2.82 2.44 0.38 0.09 *** 0.28 *** 25.15 74.85
Total 2.76 2.33 0.44 0.12 *** 0.32 *** 26.98 73.02
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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5. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the overeducation problem and its effects across the 
Spanish regions based on the SLCS micro data for the period 2004-2009. Our starting 
point is the evidence drawn from the overeducation results about the Spanish situa-
tion both internationally, with a highest level of overeducated workers, and region-
ally, with evident disparity between regions. We have analyzed the regional overe-
ducation disparities in several stages. First, by means of the estimation of Mincerian 
wage equations for each region including an overeducation dummy related to skills 
required for each occupation group. We have found a substantial significant nega-
tive effect of overeducation on the gross hourly wage for Spain (–25%) and for each 
region, ranging from –17.5% to 35%. These results may be associated with serious 
productivity and low wage problems. Moreover, the fact that this phenomenon has 
an unequal impact across the Spanish territory has also clear implications regarding 
regional development.
Secondly, the estimation of quantile regressions confirms the existence of a 
wage gap across the wage distribution in all regions, thus confirming the relevance 
of overeducation. Moreover, these findings suggest that the overeducation indicator 
is capturing genuine mismatch situations beyond the possible effect of unobserv-
able characteristics such as innate ability or motivation, as the wage gaps related to 
overeducation are systematically more pronounced in the higher percentiles of the 
wage distribution in practically all regions. This finding rejects the assumption that 
individuals with lower innate ability, thus more likely located in the lower part of the 
wage distribution, should be more penalized than the individuals located in the upper 
part of the wage distribution which could compensate their apparent overeducation 
with other types of skills.
Finally, an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition was estimated for all regions in order 
to distinguish the wage differentials between the overeducated and the matched em-
ployees. Results show, as in the previous exercises, that the effect of overeducation 
is greater for more educated workers (around –44% for tertiary education versus 
–28% for workers with at least upper secondary education). This wage gap differs 
from one region to another and seems to be explained by a greater extent by the 
coefficients effect rather than the endowments (characteristics) effect. Hence, the 
wage penalty is driven by the way that the labour market values the overeducated 
or matched worker’s characteristics. This is especially evident when we analyze 
the workers with at least upper secondary education. In this case, characteristics 
account only for 10% of the wage gap. Their relevance is higher in the case of work-
ers with tertiary education, with contributions close to 25%-30%. Nevertheless, the 
main part of the wage gap is still due to the different way the labour market values 
each characteristic.
All these results show that the effects of overeducation on the regional economies 
are genuine and substantial and present a considerable heterogeneity. The different 
analyses performed show a common feature: the existence of significant regional 
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differences in the effects of the wage determinants in general and the overeducation 
wage gap in particular. Hence, overeducation is an additional aspect to be consid-
ered when analyzing regional economies and this may imply a first step to analyze 
it deeper in future research, by controlling the decomposition not only at the mean 
but for the whole distribution. Even more, circumstances like differences in the re-
gional incidence of temporary work or the relationship between a possible excess of 
high educated employees and overeducation across regions may constitute plausible 
explanations of the overeducation issue that should be studied in future analyses. Ul-
timately, our results show that the regional level is a promising research area in order 
to better understand the problem of overeducation and the circumstances that may 
aggravate or mitigate their impact on the economy.
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Comment on «Overeducation and its Effects on Wages: 
A Closer Look at the Spanish regions», by Laura Hernández 
and Lorenzo Serrano
Raquel Llorente Heras *2
The aim of this paper is to show that the wage penalty imposed by over-education 
may be associated with high regional heterogeneity in Spain. Through the develop-
ment of several models of probabilities, logits, quantile regressions and Oaxaca de-
compositions, the authors find that it is essential to assume a regional perspective in 
analysing over-education.
This paper is of significant relevance and interest. First, over-education, a topic 
that is traditionally studied by labour economists, has recently undergone an impor-
tant update. In Spain, the pioneering papers of Alba-Ramirez (1993) and García-
Montalvo (1995) have established that one of the most adverse effects of labour 
matching is over-education, generally defined as the attainment of a higher level of 
education or training than the average level required at the workplace. Presently, the 
studies of Rahona (2008) and Rahona et al. (2010) confirm the maintenance of a sta-
ble and important educational mismatch in Spain. Alba and Blázquez (2004) expand 
the existing knowledge about over-education by analysing labour mobility, and Igle-
sias et al. (2010) show that over-education can be linked to the segregation of women, 
even in workplaces where it is low, such as in the ICT sector.
Second, the new regional economy emphasises the relevance of the development 
of regional analyses in most modern studies. For example, the study mentions some 
papers related to the national economy where the regional perspective was basic 
(García and Molina, 2002; Motellón et al., 2011; and Serrano, 2002).
Although a similar national education system extends to all Spanish regions, edu-
cational matching differs from one region to another. This is caused by variations 
in regional productive structures and unequal regional requirements for the labour 
force’s educational level. Recently, heterogeneity in regional over-education has been 
based on the existence of different regional production systems and specialisation pat-
terns. However, it has also been revealed that labour mobility is low among Spanish 
regions, and therefore, the adjustment between labour requirements at the workplace 
and the educational attainment of workers does not occur through the movement of 
the labour force or firms.
All of this means that the adjustment of wages, with a penalty for over-educated 
workers, is very heterogeneous at the regional level. Therefore, we should ask our-
selves which failures in the labour market cause the problems of educational mis-
matching, the lack of worker and firm mobility, production structures that are not 
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capable of suitably contracting the most qualified employees, inefficient wage allo-
cation in regional markets and an excessive temporality that favours labour rotation 
and/or educational segregation, among others.
It should be emphasised that the wage penalty for over-educated workers esti-
mated by this paper is approximately 25%. However, it is more worrying that, at the 
regional level, the wage penalty varies from 17.5% to 35%, setting a distance of 17.5 
points, precisely twice the minimum. This establishes a certainly unequal labour sce-
nario for Spanish workers with more education depending on their region.
Moreover, the wage penalty is uneven depending on the position of the worker, 
with the overall distribution of wages being clearly superior in the higher wage quan-
tiles. However, the wage gap associated with over-education is relevant in all regions. 
In light of these findings, the authors suggest the existence of several unobservable 
characteristics that can be captured by over-education at the regional level.
Although over-education is an important variable to take into account in the ex-
planation of regional heterogeneity, this paper, which uses Oaxaca decomposition, 
shows that the wage gap remains strongly unexplained at the regional level. This 
result reinforces the idea that future studies of the wage penalty should be developed 
with more accuracy. In many cases, an important part of the explanation for the wage 
gap is associated with unobservable variables or characteristics that lead economists 
to assume a certain self-effacement and methodological reflection. Not only must 
advances in the study of wage differentials at the regional level continue, but the tools 
for measuring the wage gap must also be improved.
Finally, I would like to end this comment with a personal reflection. One of the 
effects of the current economic crisis is the increase in unemployment among low-
skilled workers and the occupation of low-skill jobs by people with higher educa-
tional attainment (Garrido, 2012). From another perspective, workers with higher 
levels of education have accepted lower-skill jobs in order to become or remain em-
ployed (i. e., downward occupational flexibility). Given this pattern, over-education, 
a clearly countercyclical labour issue, has increased more than expected during the 
development of the current crisis. For this reason, some questions should be consid-
ered. What type of growth will we achieve if the most qualified workers are employed 
in lower-skill jobs far below their potential? How will they develop their real produc-
tivity within this labour allocation?
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